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In compounded polities, political parties need to coordinate their governing strategies 
across the central and the regional tiers of government. The coalition game is also more 
complex in these contexts, especially for the state-wide parties (SWP) that alternate in 
central office, as their need for cohesiveness across party levels is higher and the quest 
for vertical congruence across institutional levels is more pressing. This article aims at 
identifying the influence of the SWP situation at the central level on their government 
formation strategies at the regional level. By examining the Spanish case, we show that 
multi-level dynamics provide parties with incentives to trade government formation 
strategies at different levels. Particularly, when the SWP in the central government has a 
minority status, parliamentary support is more likely to be given to the investiture of 
non-state-wide parties (NSWP) in those regions where the latter are stronger. 
Furthermore, we observe that, as political decentralization advanced, SWP seem to have 
been more inclined to adopt a cooperative behaviour toward NSWP. Overall, our 
findings suggest that SWP‟s strategies are not simply interconnected across levels but 
rather regional government formation decisions are hierarchically subject to central-
level considerations.  
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The bulk of the literature on coalitions has traditionally focused on national 
governments. So far, very few studies have shifted their attention to the regional level 
(notable exceptions include Bäck, 2004; Colomer and Martínez, 1995; Downs, 1998; 
Hough and Verge, 2009; Reniu, 2005; Ştefuriuc, 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Rodríguez Teruel 
et al., 2010). Interestingly, the regional level provides researchers with the opportunity 
to examine coalition formation within a single country while counting with a relatively 
large number of cases. Regional-level approaches also allow controlling for a range of 
systemic factors identified by the literature (Laver, 1989).  
Beyond instrumental reasons, the study of coalitions at the regional level is 
relevant per se. Political competition at different levels has relevant implications for 
party organization and party strategies (Roller and van Houten, 2003; Deschouwer, 
2003; Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010), such as the coordination of action across layers 
of government, basically between the central and the regional arenas (Hopkin, 2003). 
Specifically, operating simultaneously in different party systems (state-wide and 
regional) may force parties to reach agreements with diverse partners from different 
negotiating positions (Däubler and Debus, 2009).  
Political parties might also pursue different goals at different levels (Downs, 
1998). The study of coalitions in multi-level contexts allows distinguishing party goals 
according to their territorial pervasiveness (Reniu, 2011: 119), namely between state-
wide and non-state-wide parties (SWP and NSWP henceforth, respectively). SWP 
compete in all districts in all elections and exercise a crucial linkage function between 
levels of government whereas NSWP contest regional and/or politywide elections in 
one or few regions (Fabre, 2011: 345). Hence, the coalition game is potentially more 




parties at the central level, which makes more pressing their need for cohesiveness 
across party levels and the quest for vertical congruence across institutional arenas. In 
these contexts, coalition formation processes have been defined as “nested games” 
given that governing strategies at the central and regional levels are interconnected 
(Ştefuriuc, 2007). 
This article builds on this emerging sub-field of research on coalitions by 
examining Spanish SWP‟s government formation strategies at the regional level from 
the early 1980s to 2011, comprising both the first and the most recent regional elections. 
In general, studies analysing government formation processes at the regional arena have 
focused on explaining the frequency of minority governments (Hamann and Mershon, 
2008), and the congruence across the central and the regional levels (Ştefuriuc, 2007, 
2009a). In contrast to previous research, we here follow the idea first posed by Colomer 
and Martínez (1995) who developed a model where parties could exchange their votes 
in different parliaments and reach inter-party agreements in several arenas 
simultaneously. This notion of “coalition trading” is based on the idea that a certain 
circumstance at one level will affect the coalitional strategy pursued by the party at the 
other level. We claim, however, that SWP‟s strategies are not simply interconnected 
across tiers but rather regional government formation decisions are hierarchically 
subject to central-level considerations. Hence, instead of analysing pacts in multiple 
arenas at the same time, this article aims at identifying the central level conditions under 
which parties are more likely to follow certain government formation strategies at the 
regional level. 
In doing so, the article primarily concentrates on the two main Spanish SWP, 
namely the Spanish Socialist Workers‟ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, 




Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular, AP). More concretely, we seek to identify how the 
SWP‟s position at the central level, will condition their behaviour at the regional level: 
whether they will prefer to govern alone, stay in opposition, or reach some kind of 
agreement with NSWP in the form of a coalition cabinet or an opposition-government 
collaboration. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The second section briefly 
introduces Spanish regional governments and SWP‟s participation in them. The third 
section specifies our hypotheses while the fourth describes the data and methods which 
drive the empirical analysis. The fifth section discusses the main findings in the light of 
our hypotheses. The final section highlights the contribution of the article and sets an 
agenda for further research. 
 
State-wide parties and regional governments in Spain 
As Detterbeck and Hepburn (2010: 124) remind us, “parties are struggling as much with 
the implications of state structural change resulting from multi-level governance in their 
internal organization, as they are externally in their responses to new divisions of state 
powers”. State decentralization processes impact on the most relevant dimensions of 
party organization, namely distributional conflicts over resources, the definition of 
platforms, and electoral and governing strategies (Downs, 1998; Chhibber and Kollman, 
2004). As Ştefuriuc (2007: 45) argues “[the territorialisation of electoral competition] 
requires parties to adapt to a dual logic, as the governing and opposition experiences 
might overlap in time across levels, and so might the governing-alone and the 
governing-in-coalition experiences”. 
In this sense, the Spanish case is particularly interesting for various reasons. On 




representative institutions. The governing resources and political visibility of the 
Spanish regions, the so-called Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Autónomas), 
have progressively expanded as decentralization advanced and, thus, have become 
crucial arenas for determining and implementing policy (Heller, 2002; Swenden and 
Maddens, 2009). On the other hand, the co-existence of the centre-periphery cleavage 
with the ideological left-right axis in some but not all regions has generated significant 
heterogeneity across the seventeen regional party systems (see Wilson 2012) with 
significant consequences for government formation. Although regional elections have 
been classified as second-order elections (Reiff and Schmitt, 1980; Jeffrey and Hough, 
2003), the dissimilarity of electoral outcomes and the potential (vertical) incongruence 
of government composition across levels adds intricacy to policy making (Hamann and 
Mershon, 2008; Pallarés and Keating, 2003). 
This article concentrates on state-wide parties (SWP), particularly on those 
which have governing capacity at the central level. SWP compete in all elections and 
regions throughout the territory and exercise a crucial linkage function between levels 
of government (Fabre, 2011: 345). Since 1982, only two Spanish SWP have alternated 
in central government. The PSOE governed from 1982 until 1996 (1993-96 minority 
government) and between 2004 and 2011 (in a minority status again), and the PP 
between 1996 and 2008 (2004-08 minority government) and from 2011 onwards. 
Indeed, these two parties account altogether for over 80 per cent of the seats of the 
lower house. Additionally, the PSOE and the PP are the main parties in most regions 
and their combined vote share at the regional level has significantly increased over time, 
nowadays reaching almost 80 per cent (Wilson, 2012: 128). 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the regional power hold by the PSOE and the 




1999 until 2011 regional power became much balanced between the main SWPs, with 
the PSOE taking the lead between 2003 and 2011, when regional power leaned again 
toward the PP. As of July 2011 the conservatives participated in eleven regional 
cabinets whereas the PSOE did so in just four – two single-party governments 
(Andalusia and the Basque Country) and two coalitions in which the Socialists were 
actually the junior partner and did not hold the premiership (Canary Islands and 
Navarre). 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Throughout the 1980-2011 period both SWP have been dependent on the 
support of NSWP at the central level and, at the same time, there have been numerous 
coalitional agreements between SWP and NSWP in the government of several regions. 
As it can be seen in Table 1, from 1980 up to July 2011, 30 per cent of all regional 
governments have been coalition governments, either in a minority or a majority status. 
In 47 out of 55 occasions a SWP was included in the coalition formula (85 per cent). 
Most often, regional coalition cabinets have been composed of a SWP and one or more 
NSWP (generally one). Interestingly, these governing coalitions very frequently 
reciprocate support at the central level, where the NSWP provides parliamentary 
support to the SWP in the Spanish parliament (see Ştefuriuc, 2009a and Barrio et al., 
2010).  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Given that SWP-NSWP coalitions have been more frequent for the PSOE than 
for the PP (Rodríguez Teruel et al., 2010), we might be inclined to think this is probably 
due to the fact that the PSOE is closer to the median and/or core position than the PP. 
Nonetheless, Figure 2 shows that when the two main dimensions of political 




pattern prevails. A large number of NSWP are either equidistant to both the PSOE and 
the PP or they are closer to the PSOE on one dimension but closer to the PP on the 
other. In any case, at the regional level, the PP has also reached numerous coalitional 
agreements with NSWP, either through the participation in a coalition government or 
through the support to the investiture of a NSWP single-party cabinet. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Theory and hypotheses 
As Ştefuriuc (2009a: 93-4) argues, “decentralized systems come by default with a need 
to coordinate party action across levels of governance […]. In such settings, political 
parties operate simultaneously in different party systems, hold different weights therein 
and need to strike deals with possibly different partners at different levels”. In the same 
vein, Colomer and Martínez (1995) argue that several parties can agree on 
simultaneously exchange their votes in a set of parliaments and, acting rationally in 
their own self-interest, they can reach coalitional agreements that are apparently 
paradoxical. This multi-level game is particularly interesting for SWP whose access to a 
larger set of payoffs means that the losses at one level can be compensated with benefits 
at the other. As argued by Ştefuriuc (2009a: 98), for instance, SWP are also those more 
interested in stepping into congruent coalitions. Vertical congruence refers to the 
situation in which the party composition of a regional government coincides with that of 
the central government. SWP will highly value vertical congruence across institutional 
levels as a means to smooth intergovernmental relations on key policy issues thereby 
ensuring that regional governments have a fluid relationship with the central executive 




In this article we will focus on the central-regional linkages which work as 
determinants for SWP‟s government formation strategies at the regional level using 
Spain as a case study, one of the most decentralized countries in Western Europe. In 
particular, we seek to examine the influence of the SWP situation at the central level of 
government on their choice to strike coalition deals with other allies, basically NSWP, 
either forming a coalition cabinet or supporting the investiture of a regional prime 
minister without participating in government. 
To study the determinants of SWP‟s regional government formation strategies, 
we first need to think about these parties‟ incentives. It is widely agreed that political 
parties value office, policy and votes, but different parties might assign a different 
priority to each of these goals (Strøm, 1990a) and some situations may entail trade-offs 
between them (Müller and Strøm 1999). Likewise, in multi-level polities parties might 
simultaneously pursue different goals at different levels (Downs 1998). Along these 
lines, Reniu (2011: 119) argues that SWP and NSWP have different sets of incentives to 
choose their strategies in the multi-level game of government formation. Access and 
survival in the central government is an intrinsic goal for SWPs as the polity-wide level 
is, in Deschouwer‟s (2003: 217) terms, their “core level of reference”. Regional 
government, then, becomes an instrumental goal for SWPs, but the opposite is true for 
NSWP –for which the regional level is their “core level of reference” (see also 
Ştefuriuc, 2009b: 100-101). Assuming that (at least the largest) SWP are office-
maximisers and that they will prioritize survival in office in the central government, we 
claim that the behaviour of the party at the regional level will be hierarchically subject 
to its needs at the central level. In other words, when the position of a SWP at the 
central level is weak enough to depend on the votes of other parties to gain the 




strategies for regional government formation will consider such a situation by engaging 
in a pattern of vote-exchange across levels. 
Hitherto, only single-party governments have formed in the Spanish central 
level, although majority and minority governments have alternated. In fact, since 
democratization, the proportion of single-party minority governments has been above 
50 per cent. These types of governments have relied on the support of other parties in 
the Congress of Deputies, very often through stable agreements. On these occasions, 
stable agreements with parliamentary supporting parties are equivalent to camouflaged 
or informal governing coalitions (Strøm, 1990b; for an analysis of the Spanish case, see 
Ştefuriuc, 2009b). Following the argument above, we expect SWP‟s strategies at the 
regional level to be strongly conditioned by the central level when they lead a single-
party minority government and need the support of other parties. So we go beyond what 
has been suggested by previous literature and argue that SWP will not be interested in 
congruence per se but instead they will engage in a vote-exchange pattern across levels 
to ensure the survival of the central government when they are in a minority situation 
there. In particular, we expect a more frequent use of cooperative strategies under these 
circumstances. Hence, our first hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: In minority situations at the central level, SWP will be more likely to 
pursue ‘coalition’ and ‘supporting’ strategies as opposed to ‘single-
party’ and ‘opposition’ ones at the regional level. 
 
Although the above hypothesis may apply to SWP‟s general strategies at the 
regional level, the asymmetrical elements of the Spanish political system lead us to 
think that notable differences across regions will exist (see Ştefuriuc, 2009a: 99-100). 




constitutional tracks to autonomy (fast-track versus slow-track regions), regions do also 
diverge with regard to the strength of their NSWP (Wilson, 2012). Besides the larger 
SWP (the PSOE, the PP, and the smaller United Left/Izquierda Unida, IU), three 
NSWP have traditionally been well represented in the lower chamber of the Spanish 
Parliament (Congreso de los Diputados): the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV, from the 
Basque Country), Convergence and Union (CiU, from Catalonia), and Canary Coalition 
(CC, from Canary Islands) and, more recently, Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC, 
from Catalonia). These parties are sometimes pivotal for the formation of a 
parliamentary majority at the central level (Barrio et al., 2010). Other NSWP, although 
pretty strong in their respective regional parliaments, are small and infrequently 
represented in the Spanish lower house.
1
 Given the regional differences on the potential 
influence of NSWP at the central level, we qualify the first hypothesis and state our 
second one: 
Hypothesis 2: A minority situation at the central level will make SWP more likely to 
pursue ‘coalition’ and ‘supporting’ strategies as opposed to ‘single-
party’ and ‘opposition’ ones at the regional level, especially in those 
regions where NSWP are stronger. 
 
Although we acknowledge that coalition formation is, at least, a two-party game, 
NSWP‟s preferences will not be considered in our framework. Obviously, we cannot 
assume that NSWP will always be ready to craft a coalition or a pact for the whole 
legislative term when approached by a given SWP. However, as long as NSWP are 
intrinsically interested in access to regional government, we assume that they will 
accept an agreement with the SWP that offers the most. It is true that the distance 




decision taken by the former. However, in the Spanish case, it is very seldom the case 
that the NSWP is closer to one of the two SWP in both the ideological and territorial 
dimensions of political competition, as it has been shown in Figure 2. Hence, the fact 
that most NSWP are equidistant to both SWP will make them willing to accept the 
proposal of the highest bidder. In other words, the agreement will be closed with the 
party that demands less (for a demand-based model of policy compromises between 
parties see Morelli 1999). Our argument is that the “bid” of the SWP is more likely to 
be highest when it finds itself in a situation of minority in the central level and depends 
on the support of NSWP. As a result, they will behave more cooperatively, either 
offering the NSWP good conditions to form a coalition government or will demand 
little to offer their support for the investiture of a NSWP‟s regional prime minister. 
The degree of political decentralization might also affect the types of agreements 
that parties reach at the regional level.
2
 It is reasonable to think that the higher relevance 
of regional executives in the design and implementation of policies will increase SWP‟s 
incentives to control or participate in more regional cabinets, either to coordinate the 
central government policies across the country or to confront the other SWP that leads 
the central government. In addition, political decentralization tends to consolidate the 
presence of NSWP at the regional electoral arena (De Winter et al., 2006) thereby 
expanding the opportunities for vote-exchanges between parties. Although regions do 
not hold a collective veto power within Spain‟s institutional framework and play a 
relatively minor role in the policy-making process at the central level (Aja, 2003), 
horizontal mechanisms among regional governments and intergovernmental bodies 
have expanded over time. In particular, the larger and the more substantive shared-
competences are, the more vertical congruence will matter for SWP (Ştefuriuc, 2009a: 




design and implementation of policies while in central government or as a means to 
coordinate opposition strategies to the central government otherwise. Hence, in our final 
hypothesis we expect that: 
Hypothesis 3:  SWP’s choice for cooperative strategies will become more frequent as 
political decentralization advances.  
 
Data and Methods 
The universe of our empirical analysis is Spanish post-electoral regional governments 
from 1980 to 2011. However, departing from conventional practice in comparative 
research of national governments, we consider only those cabinets formed immediately 
after new elections. Despite some cabinet formations of Spanish regional executives 
have occurred during the term (i.e. inter-election formations), most of them are due to 
rather unclear changes in the party affiliation or parliamentary group membership of 
concrete legislators. As a consequence, the distribution of seats and bargaining power 
between parties in parliament does also change and, therefore, new majorities have to 
sustain new governments. Apart from the difficulty to identify these sometimes 
cumbersome changes of legislators‟ affiliation/membership, inter-election formations 
have the disadvantage that they are, by definition, highly dependent on the post-election 
formation that preceded them. We are here interested in studying SWP‟s regional 
formation strategies depending on their situation at the central level when the range of 
choices is not restricted, by construction, by previous formations. This is why we have 
only included post-election formations in our analyses, which are in fact the great 
majority of government formations. 
Also, under those situations in which a party obtained the absolute majority of 




the predominant if not unique courses of action. Although it is still possible for majority 
parties to build oversized coalitions or to receive the support of other SWP in the 
investiture vote, these situations are very rare in the Spanish regions. The two main 
SWP have never joined an oversized coalition and the support strategy to a governing 
party that already had the absolute majority of votes in parliament has been only chosen 
three times.
3
 Given the extremely low frequency of these situations and the irrelevance 
of the investiture vote in these cases, the empirical analysis concentrates on those cases 
in which no party obtained a majority of seats after elections, which are substantively 
far more interesting. In fact, it is in these situations when SWP‟s strategies (namely, our 
dependent variable) are really relevant. 
Applying these criteria, and excluding the few SWP-SWP agreements,
4
 the 
number of government formation opportunities we analyse is 69. However, since we are 
interested in evaluating SWP‟s strategic choices in each regional government formation 
opportunity, we create two observations for each: one for the PSOE and one for the PP. 
Both parties decide at the same time what strategy to pursue and even negotiate 
concurrently with the same potential partners in order to obtain their support for a 
single-party cabinet, for a coalition, or to engage in a vote-exchange process across 
institutional levels, and this is precisely what we want to study. Hence, the number of 
observations expands to 137, 69 for the PSOE and 68 for the PP  –the difference 
obeying to the fact that the PP did not obtain parliamentary representation in the Catalan 
elections of 1980 and, therefore, did not have any strategic choice available. 
Following Hamann and Mershon (2008: 118), we define our units of analysis, 
political parties, as “recognizable teams”. If a group of politicians, even if they formally 
belong to separate parties, contest elections under the same label we treat them as a 




coalitions the PP participated in during the 1980s and early 1990s (such as Coalición 
Popular or Coalición Democrática). Different parties are also considered as one 
organization if they regularly constitute a single parliamentary group. This is the case of 
the Party of the Catalan Socialists (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, PSC), which 
organizationally substitutes for the PSOE in Catalonia, and of the Navarrese People‟s 
Union (Unión del Pueblo Navarro, UPN), which has done so for the PP in Navarre for 
several years (see Verge and Barberà, 2009). For the purposes of the empirical analyses, 
although formally independent parties, the PSC and the UPN are considered part of the 
PSOE and the PP organizations, respectively, given that they do not compete against 
each other and they do not form separate parliamentary groups.
5
 
It is also important to mention that, all throughout the paper, we understand 
SWP‟s regional coalition strategies as if decided by the central party leadership. Given 
that multi-level electoral politics introduces centrifugal pressures on SWP (see Hough 
and Jeffrey, 2006), we can imagine a situation in which a regional branch strikes a 
coalition deal while the central party opposes it. Nonetheless, the two main Spanish 
SWP are significantly vertically integrated (Fabre, 2011; Thorlakson, 2009, 2011).  
Whereas political decentralization has clearly shaped parties‟ electoral and executive 
strategies, their internal decentralization has remained quite modest (Fabre and Méndez-
Lago, 2009; Hopkin, 2009). This is why the central level clearly prevails when it comes 
to government formation strategies. To the best of our knowledge, in the past thirty 
years, there have been very few cases in which the central party has de-authorized the 
coalition agreement reached by a regional party branch, which seems to imply that 
regional governing strategies are either decided at the central level or at least 








Our main dependent variable is SWP‟s government formation strategy at the regional 
level. Following regional elections, SWP have various options or strategies at their 
disposal. As described in Table 2, we have created a nominal variable with four 
categories, namely single-party, coalition with a NSWP, supporting party (to a NSWP), 
and opposition, which correspond to the strategies available to SWP. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The supporting-party role is defined as the SWP voting in favour or abstaining in 
the investiture of a regional government that does not include itself. Even if voting „aye‟ 
sends a stronger signal of support, abstaining typically allows the investiture of a 
regional prime minister and her government.  This is why we consider abstention in the 
investiture vote as a „supporting strategy‟. We admit that a truly supporting attitude 
towards the government from the opposition benches arguably entails more than casting 
a vote on the single occasion of the investiture. However, the analysis of the complete 
voting pattern in parliament for three decades would require regional parliamentary 
voting records that are frequently unavailable. Moreover, our dependent variable refers 
to government formation strategies rather than SWP‟s behaviour during the term. 
Therefore, we have opted for the investiture vote as a highly symbolic gesture reflecting 
the (un)cooperative intentions of the SWP toward the newly invested government. It 
bears mentioning that we have also considered as an „opposition‟ strategy those 
abstentions cast in those few regional parliaments where it is not possible to openly vote 







As stated in the hypotheses, our main purpose is to identify to what extent multi-level 
dynamics matter for SWP‟s strategies in regional government formation. More 
specifically, we seek to gauge whether or not the course of action Spanish SWP decide 
to take in different regions at the time to form a (post-election) government is 
hierarchically subject to the situation of the SWP at the central level (namely, in the 
Spanish parliament and, subsequently, in the Spanish government).
7
 As a result, our 
independent variables are the following: 
 Central Government (CG): This is a categorical variable with three values 
distinguishing whether i) the SWP controls the majority of seats at the central 
level, whether ii) it governs in a minority situation, or rather, iii) it remains in 
opposition, the latter being the reference category. 
 % Seats NSWP: This variable measures the percentage of seats obtained by the 
largest NSWP in each region. It is also interacted with the SWP‟s status at the 
central government. 
 Regional Authority Index: We use the index created by Hooghe et al. (2010) 
which captures the level of authority of regional entities in decentralized 
countries on an annual basis. This index measures both the self-rule and shared-
rule dimensions of political decentralization. Data is available for the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities for the period 1978-2006. As a result, we lose some 
observations in those analyses where this variable is included, specifically the 
2007 and 2011 post-electoral government formations.  
 Party: This dummy identifies the SWP party in the analyses („1‟ for the PP and 





 Days to general elections: We include as a control variable the time left to the 
next general elections, measured in days, taking as a benchmark the last regional 
elections which produced the new (post-election) government. The influence of 
the situation of the SWP in central government on how it will behave in the 
regional government might be considerably conditioned by how long the central 
government is expected to last. Electoral cycles are crucial as the timing of 
elections at the different levels forces parties to introduce different time horizons 
simultaneously in their calculations (see Deschouwer, 2009; Däubler and Debus, 
2009). As a result, when regional elections are close to the upcoming general 
elections, SWP might use government formation at the regional level as a 
“testing ground” for vertical congruence at the polity-wide level (Ştefuriuc, 
2009c: 6).  
 
Given the categorical nature of our dependent variable, we run multinomial 
logistic regressions where the strategy „opposition‟ is specified as the reference 
category. Since we have two observations for each post-election government formation 
and the strategies of both the PSOE and the PP are likely to be closely linked, we have 




Discussion of findings 
According to our first hypothesis, we expect that SWP‟s situation at the central level 
will affect their government formation strategies at the regional level. We have argued 
that their behaviour will tend to be more cooperative when the SWP leads the central 
government in a minority situation in parliament. Table 3 shows that, in the absence of 




the SWP runs a majority government at the central level, although only the latter is 
statistically significant at a 99 per cent confidence level. Simultaneously, under this 
situation, SWP seem to be more prone to form single-party governments at the regional 
level. These first findings are tentatively consistent with the first hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, under minority situations at the central government, our first analysis does 
not reveal any relevant effect: the three displayed strategies of the dependent variable 
seem to be more likely than the reference category (an overtly opposition strategy), but 
the estimations are far from statistical significance. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Yet, when the regional dimension is incorporated into the analysis through the 
variables size of the NSWP (% Seats NSWP) and number of days left to the next 
general elections the results substantially change. In Table 4 we can see that the 
interaction between the minority situation of the SWP at the central level and the 
percentage of seats of the main NSWP in a given region has a positive sign and reaches 
standard levels of statistical significance for the strategy „support‟ (model 2). This 
finding is congruent with hypothesis 2. Indeed, under minority situations, SWP seem to 
be more likely to adopt cooperative strategies at the regional level („support‟, in 
particular), most clearly where NSWP are stronger. Although the variable days to 
general election never reaches the significance level, the coefficient is consistently 
negative for the „coalition‟ and „support‟ strategies, showing that the greater the time 
remaining for the next general election the less cooperative SWP will behave. To put it 
differently, SWP will be interested in sending a signal of cooperation to NSWP in the 
region the closer the elections at the central level are in order to secure their support and 
form congruent coalitions across levels.  




 Figure 3 shows a linear fit simulation of the predicted probability of the 
„support‟ strategy as the size of the main NSWP in the region increases, for two 
different situations of the SWP at the central government. In those regions where 
NSWPs are weak, the probability of adopting a „support‟ strategy toward them is 
logically 0, irrespective of the SWP having a minority status at the central government. 
However, the multi-level effect clearly emerges where NSWPs are stronger. In these 
regions, SWPs are much more likely to support the investiture of the candidate of a 
NSWP when they are in a minority status at the central government than in other 
situations.  
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Models 3 and 4 incorporate the Regional Authority Index (RAI) in the 
regressions. As mentioned earlier, the RAI is only available until 2006, which forces us 
to work with a sub-sample of the longitudinal data used until now. Interestingly, the 
inclusion of the RAI reveals that, as political decentralization advanced, the „support‟ 
strategy became more likely. This finding is consistent to our third hypothesis: the 
increasing relevance of regions in the political landscape of Spain seems to have pushed 
SWP to be more cooperative at the regional level when it comes the time to form a 
government. Finally, we should also mention that some statistical differences emerge 
comparing the behaviour of the two main SWP. All else being equal, the PP seems to 
have been slightly more inclined to adopt cooperative strategies, while it has been less 
prone (or less able) to govern alone in the regions. The main intention behind the 
inclusion of this dummy was, however, to control for potential partisan “fixed-effects”. 
These differences do certainly deserve further qualitative insight but they fall beyond 




central level situation of SWP on their regional government formation strategies, 
controlling for the specific party we look at. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In Western Europe, the regional tier of government has acquired increasing authority 
and visibility in past decades. Apart from the implications it has had for party 
organization, government formation in multi-level polities has required parties to 
coordinate their governing action across levels. This need has been especially pressing 
for SWP, as their governing and opposition experiences overlap in time across levels. 
Therefore, the analysis of the central-regional linkages in government formation 
processes requires special attention. This article takes a step forward in this direction. 
We have focused on SWP‟s government formation strategies at the regional level in 
order to disentangle under what conditions SWP will prefer to pact with NSWP.  
Our initial expectation was that minority situations at the central government 
should lead SWP to adopt more cooperative strategies at the regional level in order to 
secure the support of other parties, namely NSWP, at the central level. This hypothesis 
has been to a great extent confirmed by the empirical analysis, although only for regions 
where NSWP have a significant weight. For arithmetic reasons, this is not particularly 
surprising as we should expect SWP to close agreements with NSWP precisely in those 
regions where the latter are important political actors. Yet, our results also show that in 
these regions SWP opt for cooperative strategies (outside parliamentary support, 
mainly) when they have a minority status at the central government much more 
frequently than in any other situation. Therefore, our empirical analysis of regional 
government formation processes in Spain for the entire democratic period (1980-2011) 




SWP adopt when regional elections have been held and a new government has to be 
formed. Finally, the empirical analysis has also revealed a dynamic trend. SWP‟s 
strategies seem to have changed over time in response to the process of political 
decentralization. As the regional tier acquired more authority, SWP have become more 
likely to adopt cooperative strategies. 
With a view to confirming the importance of the multi-level dynamics and 
identifying potential differences across parties as regards their strategies, future 
qualitative analyses could examine in greater detail the regional government strategies 
of the PSOE and the PP separately. In-depth investigation of the impact of political 
decentralization processes on parties‟ incentives and strategies at the regional level 
could also prove fruitful. Last, given their simplicity and generalisability, the 
hypotheses presented in this article can be easily applied to other decentralized countries 
where the multi-level context makes parties‟ governing and opposition experiences 






                                                 
1
 In fact, they frequently participate in coalitions in their regions, such as the PAR (Aragon), CDN 
(Navarre), EA (Basque Country), and PRC (Cantabria), among others (see Reniu, 2005 and Rodríguez 
Teruel et al., 2010). Amaiur (Basque Country) will merit especial attention in future regional elections. 
 
2
 Falcó-Gimeno (2012), for instance, finds that increasing decentralization over time makes regional 
cabinet portfolios more attractive for parties participating in a regional coalition government. 
 
3
 The PP supported the investiture of former regional prime minister Jordi Pujol in Catalonia in 1984 




 Apart from SWP-NSWP regional agreements, some pacts have only involved two SWP. Yet, during the 
whole period under study, SWP-SWP coalitions have only taken place three times, one in Castile Leon 
(1989-1991) between the PP and the Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), and twice in Asturias between 
the PSOE and the left-wing United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) (2003-2007 and 2008-2011; for an analysis 
of the participation of IU in regional coalition governments see Ştefuriuc and Verge (2008)). Also, in the 
Balearic Islands, the coalition governments led by the PSOE (1999-2003 and 2007-2011) had to include 
the IU along with various NSWP in order to secure the majority of seats. The cases of support or coalition 
between SWP occurred in the Basque Country in 2009 (the PP supported the investiture of the PSOE), 
and in Navarre in 1999 and 2007 (the PSOE supported the investiture of UPN which at that time was the 
organizational substitute of the PP in the region). Likewise, in 2003 the PSOE and IU formed a post-
electoral coalition in Asturias. Since we focus on SWP‟s strategies vis-à-vis NSWP, we have decided not 
to include SWP-SWP agreements in any of the categories of the dependent variable and drop them from 
the analyses in order to reduce bias. 
 
5
 As an exception to this general rule, the UPN and the PP are considered as different parties in the 
Navarrese regional elections of 1983, 1987, and 2011, since both parties then run in separate lists. 
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6
 In 2007 PSOE‟s regional branch in Navarre was about to close a coalition agreement with several 
NSWP when negotiations were abruptly called off by the central party leadership (see Fabre 2008). 
Regarding IU, although we do not examine this party here, after the 2011 regional elections the 
Extremadura regional branch contravened the central party instructions to support the investiture of the 
PSOE candidate and supported instead the investiture of the PP candidate through an abstention. 
 
7
 It is important to note that it is beyond the scope of this paper to adopt an integral approach to 
government formation in Spanish regional governments. There is certainly a greater number of variables 
at play to understand what types of government finally form. However, as already highlighted, in this 
article we are just interested in exploring how SWP‟s situation at the central level affects their 
government formation strategies at the regional level. 
 
8
 We have run additional analyses including some control variables to capture the influence of certain 
institutional factors that may impact on the choice of the government strategies, such as the percentage of 
deputies needed to present a vote of no-confidence or the consequences of a failed investiture. However, 
since these variables did not influence the direction or the strength of the coefficients, they are not 
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Table 1. SWPs in regional governments, 1980-2011 
Type of government 
SWPs in government No SWPs in 
government 
TOTAL 
PSOE PP Other (CDS) 
Single-party 51 (66%) 59 (76%) 0 18 (69%) 128 (70%) 
Coalition 26 (34%) 18 (24%) 3 (100%) 8 (31%) 55 (30%) 
TOTAL 77 (100%) 77 (100%) 3 (100%) 26 (100%) 183 (100%) 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on Ştefuriuc (2007) and updated by the authors. 
Note: The table includes both post-electoral and inter-electoral governments. The majority/minority status 






Table 2. SWPs‟ government formation strategy at the regional level 
Single-party Coalition Supporting Opposition 
The SWP forms a 
single-party 
government, including 
no other partner. 
The SWP forms a 
cabinet with one or 
various NSWPs. 
The SWP supports the 
investiture of a NSWP 
candidate, casting a 
positive vote or 
abstaining. 
The SWP votes 
against the investiture 










Table 3. Multinomial regression analysis: Basic model 
 Single-party Coalition Support 
    
Majority at the central government (CG) 
1.166* -0.377 -14.614*** 
(0.625) (0.666) (0.670) 
Minority at the CG 
0.629 0.663 1.098 
(0.703) (0.589) (0.787) 
Constant 
-1.658*** -0.904*** -2.639*** 
(0.382) (0.291) (0.603) 






Standard errors clustered by government in parenthesis. 






Table 4. Multinomial regression analysis: Full models 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 Single-party Coalition Support Single-party Coalition Support Single-party Coalition Support Single-party Coalition Support 
             
Majority at the 
central government 
(CG) 
0.907 -0.569 -13.719*** 0.587 -1.572 -19.931*** 1.254* -0.687 -15.286*** 0.847 -1.849 -18.573*** 
(0.585) (0.861) (0.928) (0.774) (1.351) (1.512) (0.714) (0.813) (0.960) (0.879) (1.317) (1.720) 
Minority at the CG 
0.471 0.200 1.093 0.520 -0.657 -824.917*** 0.833 -0.170 -0.079 0.590 -1.655 -846.362*** 
(0.740) (0.720) (0.893) (0.916) (1.151) (40.255) (0.969) (0.794) (0.941) (1.135) (1.549) (41.152) 
% Seats NSWP 
-0.082*** -0.006 0.172* -0.083*** -0.026 0.089** -0.079*** -0.009 0.146*** -0.088*** -0.039 0.111** 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.091) (0.024) (0.018) (0.039) (0.018) (0.012) (0.055) (0.029) (0.024) (0.050) 
Majority at the CG * 
% Seats NSWP 
   0.019 0.049 -0.095**    0.023 0.061 -0.112* 
   (0.046) (0.044) (0.048)    (0.049) (0.047) (0.064) 
Minority at the CG * 
% Seats NSWP 
   -0.040 0.043 20.274***    -0.004 0.072 20.766*** 
   (0.077) (0.039) (0.995)    (0.071) (0.053) (1.022) 
Days to general 
elections 
0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Party (PP) 
-0.487 -0.646 1.180 -0.479 -0.713 20.206*** -0.193** 0.703** -0.069 -0.185* 0.681** 0.149 
(0.558) (0.690) (0.831) (0.534) (0.685) (6.991) (0.094) (0.333) (0.275) (0.096) (0.337) (0.180) 
Regional Authority 
Index 
      -0.363 -0.535 2.179** -0.415 -0.607 21.641*** 
      (0.637) (0.708) (1.031) (0.631) (0.719) (1.001) 
Constant 
-0.494 0.073 -7.999** -0.396 0.512 -24.141*** 3.161* -14.957** -4.465 3.213* -13.829* -27.664*** 
(0.584) (0.685) (3.255) (0.619) (0.771) (0.994) (1.751) (7.388) (5.320) (1.707) (7.427) (3.797) 
             
Observations 137 137 113 113 
Pseudo-R2 0.167 0.211 0.200 0.241 
 
Standard errors clustered by government in parentheses. 























































Figure 2. Party position in the two main dimensions of political competition 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on CIS study number 2829 (2010). Data reports attributed 
location of parties by Spanish voters 
Ideology: 0 (left) – 10 (right); decentralization: 0 (decentralization) – 10 (centralization). 
Acronyms: PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español); PP (Partido Popular); IU/ICV 
(Izquierda Unida/Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds); UPyD (Unión Progreso y Democracia); CC 
(Coalición Canaria); PAR (Partido Aragonés); CHA (Chunta Aragonesista); CiU 
(Convergència i Unió); ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya); Ciutadans PC (Ciudadanos 
– Partido de la Ciudadanía); PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco); EA (Eusko Alkartasuna); 
Aralar (Aralar); UPN (Unión del Pueblo Navarro); CDN (Convergencia de Demócratas de 
Navarra); BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego); BNV (Bloc Nacionalista Valencià); PSM Entesa 
Nacionalista (Partit Socialista de Mallorca/Menorca – Entesa Nacionalista); UM (Unió 
Mallorquina); PRC (Partido Regionalista Cántabro); PR (Partido Riojano); UPL (Unión del 
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